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µ7KH3ROLWLFDO¶DQGWKH(135ethinking the EU Relations with the Eastern Region 
 
Elena A. Korosteleva, Igor Merheim-Eyre & Eske van Gils 
 
Abstract 
Drawing on Jenny (GNLQV¶post-structuralist LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIµSROLWLFV¶DQGµWKH
SROLWLFDO¶, this chapter offers a new conceptual account of the stagnated relations 
between the European Union and the eastern region. Part of the difficulty, as this 
FKDSWHUDUJXHVLVWKH(8¶VIDLOXUHWRLPDJLQHDnew social order, which would give a 
relational value to the Other, and become more accommodating of the QHLJKERXUV¶ 
diverse and different world views. The chapter problematizes power relations as a 
SURFHVVRIµothering¶LQRUGHUto re-conceptualize them via the key notions of 
µdifferentiation¶ conceived as distinction rather than deviation, and µnormalization¶, 
seen as the interplay between different normalities. It DUJXHVIRUEULQJLQJµWKHSROLWLFDO¶
back in as an opportunity to imagine and legitimize contesting social orders. 
 
 
Introduction: tKH(8¶VORQJMRXUQH\ to the neighbourhood 
 
The European Union (EU) has come a long way in attempting to develop more 
sustainable relations with its neighbourhood. ,QLWLDOO\FRQFHLYHGDVDµSUR[LPLW\SROLF\¶
(European Commission 2003), a mixed approach with an ambitious and yet ambiguous 
2 
YLVLRQWRµVHHD³ULQJRIIULHQGV´ surrounding the Union «IURP0RURFFRWR5XVVLDDQG
WKH%ODFN6HD¶3URGL within a decade it has evolved into a comprehensive 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) with a complex set of wide-ranging instruments 
and outreach activities. More specifically, by 2009 the policy branched out into two 
distinct regional initiatives ± the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and the Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM) ± and now boasts a more differentiated focus and a highly 
technocratic apparatus of expertise, budgetary and legal instruments. The Association 
Agreements (AAs) in particular have become a referent framework for structuring the 
EU external relations especially in the East, which aside the political acquis, also 
comprised Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) and Mobility 
Partnerships (European Commission 2015b). 
 
And yet, the policy has been struggling to gain traction within the neighbourhood, and 
remains surprisingly ineffectual in terms of stabilizing the region and delivering the 
EU¶V transformative agenda. IQWKH(8¶VRZQDGPLWWDQFHµWRGD\¶VQHLJKERXUKRRGLV




and its partners, aggravating economic and social pressures, irregular migration and 
UHIXJHHIORZVVHFXULW\WKUHDWVDQG«GLYHUJLQJDVSLUDWLRQV¶European Commission 
2015a: 2).  
 
What has gone amiss in the EU relations with its neighbourhood, and especially the 
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Eastern region, which is the focus of this chapter? Part of the problem, as this chapter 
contendsLVWKH(8¶VFRQWLQXLQJIDLOXUHWRLPDJLQHDnew social order, which would 
give a relational value to the Other, the outsiders, and not by way of disciplining them 
to the EU¶V purported standards, but rather by way of aligning existing differences to a 
PXWXDOO\DJUHHDEOHµQRUP¶While generally being reflective in its external approach, 
which mainly focuses on the expansion of the new policy and financial instruments, the 
EU admittedly struggles to understand the world beyond its borders ± that is, the world 
as pari passu, and yet predicated on different norms and often driven by complementary 
commitments. Instead, what seems to be increasingly the case, is that the EU perceives 
the outside as an opportunity to extend its own mode of governance µinside-out¶ 
(Lavenex 2004), and not by way of contestation ± µWKHSROLWLFDO¶± but rather by way of 
µSROLWLFV¶, that is, as a process of establishing its rules of the game (Edkins 1999). At the 
same time, we often forget that µSROLWLFVLVQRWLQDQ\VHQVHJLYHQ¶DQGWKDWµLWLVWKH
UHVXOWRIFRQWHVWDWLRQ¶'RQDOG& Hall quoted in Edkins 1999: 2). Hence, when 
externalized, it has to be open to ideological struggles and mutations to render the 
production of a new optimal space and reciprocal circuits of power legitimate and 
sustainable, before sealing them off by rules of bureaucracy and technology of 
expertise. As Edkins (1999: xii) insists, in WRGD\¶V world, µPXFKRIZKDWZHFDOO
³SROLWLFV´LVLQPDQ\VHQVHV³GHSROLWLFL]HG´RUWHFKQRORJL]HGWKHURRPIRUUHDOSROLWLFDO
FKDQJHKDVEHHQGLVSODFHGE\DWHFKQRORJ\RIH[SHUWLVHRUWKHUXOHRIEXUHDXFUDF\¶, thus 
leaving the world more exposed and vulnerable to the normative impositions with 
ensuing conflicts of interest and resistance ± a situation to which the conflicts in 
Ukraine and the wider neighbouring region unambiguously testify. 
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Based on scholarly literature and empirical research in Brussels, Baku and Chisinau 
between 2014, and 2015, this chapter takes the opportunity to revisit and reframe the 
EU¶Vagenda in the Eastern neighbourhood. It argues that in order to make EU policies 
more sustainable for dealing with µthe outside¶ as distinct and yet permeable to the 
negotiation of new boundaries of knowledge, one can no longer afford to simply tinker 
with policy contents or to experiment with new instruments and budgets. A new outlook 
is required which would problematize the very fundamentals of the EU¶V relations with 
the outside in order to imbue a new sense of direction and commitment both for the EU 
and its Eastern partners. This chapter therefore contends that EU µpolitics¶ ought to 
become more open to ideological debate and contestation: it needs to be µUH-politicizHG¶, 
ZLWKµWKHSROLWLFDO¶ILUPO\HQWHULQJµWKHSROLWLFV¶DJHQGDSUHFLVHO\to challenge the 
hegemony of the existing liberal world order and to unlock the potential for making 
power relations more attuned with the outside and consequently more sustainable. 
 
The chapter will proceed as follows. After introducing the conceptual framework of 
µSROLWLFV¶DQGµWKHSROLWLFDO¶we will evaluate the ontology of the EU¶V relations with the 
Eastern region, to expose its self-domineering and depoliticized modus operandi. It will 
be argued that while generally reflective, the EU¶VDSSURDFKUHPDLQV predominantly 
unilateral and technocratic, effectively SURPRWLQJ(8µSROLWLFV¶D technocracy of 
governance) rather than engaging with µWKHSROLWLFDO¶DVDQRSSRUWXQLW\WRlegitimate its 
course and unlock the potential for a new reciprocal space. Consequently, being caught 
LQLWVRZQµSROLWLFV¶the EU continues to grapple with the concept of µothering¶, unable 
to µPRYe RXWVLGH¶(Foucault 2007: 117) WRXQGHUVWDQGWKHZRUOGIRUµZKDWLWLV¶UDWKHU
for µZKDWLWVKRXOGEH¶IURPWKH(8¶VSHUVSHFWLYH. Hence, bringing µWKHSROLWLFDO¶EDFN
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in, and repoliticizing EU external relations, we argue, may shed a new light on our 
understanding of the role of the Other in making EU regional politics more effective and 
sustainable. Furthermore, we will demonstrate the relevance of µothering¶ by unpacking 
its two central tenets ޤ µGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQ¶ DQGµQRUPDOLzDWLRQ¶7KHIRUPHUKDVEHFRPHa 
NH\ZRUGLQWKH(8¶VUHYLVHGneighbourhood strategy (European Commission 2015b), 
and yet, it still SXUSRUWVµGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQ¶DV µGHYLDWLRQ¶IURPWKH(8-set norms, instead 
of conceiving it as a process of alignment with SDUWQHUV¶QHHGV and perceptions, which 
will be effectively shown with reference to the example of the EU-Azerbaijan relations. 
µNormalizDWLRQ¶which signifies the interplay of different normalities (Foucault 2007), 
UHTXLUHVWKH(8¶Vrecognition and acceptance of differing norms in a joint effort to 
harmonize relations towards a new joint µnormal¶, which in turn will be illustrated on 




In her seminal work, Jenny Edkins (1999: 1) argues WKDWLURQLFDOO\µZKDWZHFDOO
³SROLWLFV´>WRGD\@LVDQDUHDRIDFWLYLW\WKDWLQPRGHUQ:HVWHUQVRFLHW\LV
³GHSROLWLFL]HG´¶, being effectively reduced to calculability and normative transmission 
of the pre-meditDWHGµWUXWK¶by an established authority ± to replace contestation and 
ideological struggles. µ7KHSROLWLFDO¶WKDWQRUPDOO\HSLWRPLzes an opening, and 
ideological canvassing for a new course of ideas becomes increasingly µIRUJRWWHQ¶DQG
deposed by µSROLWLFV¶, which usually serves to institutionalize and reinforce the very 
outcome of this struggle. In WRGD\¶V risk-averse environment, µSROLWLFV¶ thus has come to 
be associated with security to minimize less SUHGLFWDEOHµSROLWLFDOPXWDWLRQV¶DQGPDNH
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µthe SROLWLFDO¶ history. It now assumes both the process, the actual struggle of ideas (µWKH
SROLWLFDO¶) and the outcome of that struggle µSROLWLFV¶, to allow for normative expansion 
of a domineering social order µinside-out¶, without disputation and taken as a given. In 
this context, µSROLWLFV¶HIIHFWLYHO\EHFRPHVDWULXPSKRIWKH6HOIRYHUWKHOther, 
reducing the Other to its mere extension and normative fantasizing about the outside.   
 
What are the implications of this µSROLWLFV-GULYHQ¶ social order, and how is it relevant to 
the re-framing of the conceptual agenda of the ENP/EaP? As Edkins (1999: 126) 
argues, µpROLWLFV¶normally equates with a debate that occurs within the limits set by the 
already established social RUGHUZKHQDOHJLWLPDWHDXWKRULW\HPHUJHVWRH[HUWµD
bureaucratic technique of governance elaborated through recognized expertise and 
HQGRUVHG«WKURXJKDUHJXODUULWXDOUHSODFHPHQWRIWKHSODFHKROGHUVRIDXWKRULW\¶
(Ibid:4). It does not account for how power as a domineering circuit of influence 
µHVWDEOLVKHVDVRFLDORUGHUDQGDFRUUHVSRQGLQJIRUPRIOHJLWLPDF\¶RUH[SODLQ
KRZµRQHVRFLDOIRUPUDWKHUWKDQDQRWKHUHPHUJHVIURPDSHULRGRIFRQWHVWDWLRQDQG
VWUXJJOH¶7RXQGHUVWDQGSROLWLFDOVWUXJJOHVRQHQHHGVµWKHSROLWLFDO¶the moment of 
undecidedness and struggle ± an optimal space for dialogue and subsequent 
reconciliation. However, LIµWKHSROLWLFDO¶DVDSURFHVVRIPXWDWLRQRIRQHVRFLDORUGHU
into the next, becomes µforgotten¶ and simply replaced by the µSROLWLFV¶ of a given order, 
as one increasingly observes in WRGD\¶V domineering  liberal world order ޤ epitomized 
E\WKHµQRUPDWLYHSRZHU Europe¶GHEDWH0DQQHUV) ޤ then the relational value of 
the Other also becomes dispensable, with some profound implications for the stability 
and legitimation of the existing hegemonic order. Two particular consequences are of 
critical relevance to the debate in the volume. 
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First, if the Other is dispensed of in power relations, the outside EHFRPHVµIRUJRWWHQ¶
DQGLQVWHDGµLPDJLQHG¶DVµZKDWLWVKRXOGEH¶UDWKHUWKDQµZKDWLWLV¶7KLVµLQVLGH-RXW¶
approach, as is often exercized by the established powers (including the EU and 
Russia), may lead to a diminished need for external learning and a natural 
overestimation of RQH¶V own Self-worth. In this order of things, WKHµSROLWLFV¶RIWKH6HOI
becomes naturally domineering and increasingly involved, as Edkins (1999) argues, in 
the production RILWVRZQµWUXWK¶DERXWWKHRXWVLGH, this way compensating for its lack of 
NQRZOHGJHDERXWWKH2WKHU:KDWHPHUJHVWKHQLVDµODQJXDJH¶RUµGLVFRXUVH¶JDPH
ZKLFKEHFRPHVQRWDWRROµWRH[SUHVVLGHDVDERXWUHDOLW\¶EXWUDWKHUDSURFHVVRI
HPEHGGLQJµWKHVpeaking subject ... in a pre-H[LVWLQJODQJXDJHVWUXFWXUH¶ibid.: 22), 
serving one purpose only, namely WRFRQYH\WKHSXUSRUWHGµWUXWK¶DQGUHLQIRUFHWKH
boundaries of the established order. 7KHµWUXWK¶DVDQROGVD\LQJJRHVLVQRORQJHUERUQ
out of disputation; it arrives with instructions of the domineering authority. In the 
meantime, a µIRUJRWWHQ¶ Other may rebel and backfire, leaving the Self unprepared for 
GHDOLQJZLWKµRWKHU-QHVV¶DVIRUH[DPSOHLQWKHFDVHRIWKH(8vis-à-vis the 
neighbourhood, confronted by the assertive presence of Russia, resistant Azerbaijan, or 
the ignominious Islamic State.   
 
Second, in this dominated world of the Self, what is left to the Other, if not to fend for 
itself? From this perspective of a hegemonic Self, the power struggle is intrinsic, aiming 
to compel the outsiders to submission. In response, the inferior Other would either seek 
to increase their power resource differentials (for instance the arms acceleration 
between the United States and the Soviet Union GXULQJWKH&ROG:DURUµGLUHFWWDFLW
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pressure or open action towards the decrease of power differentials responsible for their 
LQIHULRUSRVLWLRQ¶(OLDV: 22). Russia¶Vresurgence, in the context of the Ukrainian 
crisis since 2013, is perhaps a more instructive example of how the increase of its own 
power resource differential (via the Eurasian trade bloc, destabilization of Ukraine or 
facilitation of µIUR]HQ¶FRQIOLFWV) could negatively affect WKH(8¶VSUHVHQFHand 
potentially offset its credibility in the region of overlapping strategic interest.  
 
Whichever the outcome, the world of the Self without the Other, dominated by power 
µSROLWLFV¶at the expense of µWKHSROLWLFDO¶is not a safe and stable place. It perpetuates 
the logic of exceptionalism, inequality and expansionism, becoming further removed 
from the reality itself. The task ahead is to revisit the fundamentals, and to µUHSROLWLFLzH¶
WKHµSROLWLFV¶RIµWKHHVWDEOLVKHG order¶in order to open space for more dialogue and 
reconciliation between the existing and potentially emergent knowledge regimes. 
Furthermore, this, more discernible approach to WKHUROHRIµWKHSROLWLFDO¶may also help 
to reset WKH(8¶Vexternal agenda, especially when applied to the volatile and resistant 
neighbourhood. In this chapter we argue that while being reflective, the EU struggles to 
µPRYHRXW¶RILWVµSROLWLFV¶DSSURDFK, which invariably thwarts all its technocratic 
innovations and circumvents its very effort at reform and adaptation. As the 2015 
review of the ENP strategy indicates (European Commission & High Representative 
2015b; 2015c), a technology of expertise and bureaucracy of governance will continue 
to dominate the EU external agenda, simply because WKHFRQVWUXFWHGYDOXHRIWKH(8¶V
Self entirely overshadows the relational need for the Other, DQGµWKHSROLWLFDO¶ 
 
In the meantime, ensuing volatility, normative UHVLVWDQFHDQG5XVVLD¶VUHVXUJHQFH in the 
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Eastern neighbourhood attest to a premature closure of rationalizing and extending EU 
governance, which, if anything, rHTXLUHVIXUWKHUFRQWHVWDWLRQDQGZLQQLQJµWKHKHDUWV
DQGPLQGV¶RIWKHJHQHUDOSXEOLFThis chapter argues that in order to rationalize 
convergence and understand the disconnects in legitimation and reasons for resistance, 
WKH(8¶V Self ought to become part of the other, and be vetted and contested by the 
normative discourses of the existing and conflicting power modalities, in order to re-
imagine the boundaries of µpolitics¶ and µthe political¶ in the wider neighbourhood. 
From this perspective, it is not only µothering¶ that acquires a new meaning, but so do 
differentiation and normalization as its conceptual tenets. ,QWKLVFDVHµGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQ¶LV
QRORQJHUUHGXFHGWRµdeviation¶ from the EU¶V purported standards, but rather seen as 
reciprocation with SDUWQHUV¶interests and expectations, in a joined-up policy effort. 
Normalization, in turn, shifts the policy focus away from WKH(8¶V prescriptive 
approach to finding a new optimal space for the µVKDUHGQRUPDO¶ jointly deduced 
through best practice and knowledge exchange.  
  
Against this conceptual backdrop, this chapter explores WKHLQWHUSOD\RIµSROLWLFV¶DQG
µWKHSROLWLFDO¶ as a method of defining and locating the Self and the Other in the EU¶V 
Eastern neighbourhood. More specifically, it argues that the ENP and the EaP in 
SDUWLFXODUVKRXOGEHVLWXDWHGZLWKLQDFRQWLQXXPRIµSROLWLFV¶DVGHSROLWLFLzed space) 
DQGµWKHSROLWLFDO¶ as an open space for debate in order to develop a better understanding 
of the existing and emergent subjectivities. In what follows, we briefly evaluate the 
(8¶VSURFHVVes of governance to expose its key shortcoming ± the premature closure of 
µthe political¶ in the contested Eastern region ±  to then proceed to exploring the merit of 
µothering¶ in the EU-Azerbaijan and EU-Moldovan relations more specifically. 
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)XUWKHUPRUHLQFRQWUDVWWR(GNLQV¶approach, we will demonstrate that a shift 
WRZDUGVµWKHSROLWLFDO¶GRHVQRWPHUHO\RFFXUDVD UHVXOWRIELJµUDSWXUHV¶VXFKDVZDUV
genocide or famines; rather this shift could be gradual and, more so, inclusive of 
µSROLWLFV¶DVSDUWRIµWKHSROLWLFDO¶ 
 
The (8¶VJRYHUQDQFHand the importance of µothering¶ 
 
The EU has been continuingly  UHIOHFWLYHRILWVµSROLWLFV¶LQWKHEastern region, and yet it 
has been so unilaterally, exclusively from its own perspective. Our analysis suggests 
that the EU has undergone at least three paradigmatic shifts in trying to re-conceptualize 
and re-structure its external relations ± RUZKDWFRXOGEHFRPPRQO\UHIHUUHGWRDVµ(8
external JRYHUQDQFH¶LQWKHZLGHUVFKRODUVKLS%örzel 2010; Lavenex 2004; Gänzle 
2009) ± to make them more effective and sustainable. The EU efforts clearly 
demonstrate its reform potential, but at the same time, they also expose some significant 
limitations in dealing with the outsideLQWKHDEVHQFHRIµWKHSROLWLFDO¶.  
 
The first paradigmatic shift in EU governance occurred when conceptualizing the ENP 
as a different tool to enlargement. The ENP ZDVODXQFKHGLQDVDQµHQODUJHPHQW-
lite¶DSSURDFK3RSHVFX& Wilson 2009) to ensure innovation in method and strategy; 
DQG\HWLWZDVYHU\PXFKGRPLQDWHGE\WKHµSROLWLFV¶DQGµWKHPHFKDQLFV¶RI
enlargement, seen DWWKHWLPHDVµXQDUJXDEO\WKH[EU¶V] most successful foreign policy 
LQVWUXPHQW¶European Commission 2003: 5). Consequently, EU relations with the new 
neighbourhood assumed a natural format of (8µSROLWLFV¶± that is, transferring the EU 
normative acquis µinside-out¶ (Lavenex 2004). The prevalent EU modus operandi at the 
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time could be described as µGLVFLSOLQDU\JRYHUQDQFH¶, which main features included (1) 
a hierarchical mode of coordination favouring executive bias and bilateral 
communication with national governments; (2) a binary way of inculcating EU 
normative practices in the form of a µWDNH-it±or-leave-LW¶approach without regional 
differentiation; and (3) prescriptive delivery of EU governance via strict conditionality 
and disciplinary actions (sanctions, µnaming and shaming¶ and other means of economic 
or political statecraft). Given its EU-centric nature, this approach naturally bore only a 
limited appeal for the neighbourhood, instead registering wide-spread disappointment 
and even resistance across the region (Kelley 2006; Raik 2006). In response to this 
rather disfavouring and ill-legitimated policy reception, the EU sought to modify its 
approach to make it more adaptable to its external environment; however, it sought to 
do so µinside-out¶, DQGQRWE\ZD\RIµWKHSROLWLFDO¶EXWµSROLWLFV¶RQFHPRUH 
 
The second shift ± which we term here as EU µdeliberative governance¶ ± coincided 
with the launch of the EaP (European Commission 2009). It is associated with more 
differentiated forms of regional coordination and SDUWQHUV¶closer involvement with the 
terms set by the EU¶V policy negotiations. Most notably, since 2009 EU relations with 
the neighbourhood envisaged active partnership via a dual-track approach and a 
network expansion of horizontal linkages with new and emergent external stakeholders. 
Civil society, for example, was LGHQWLILHGDVDNH\UHVRXUFHIRUWKH(8¶VWUDQVIRUPDWLYH
agenda, and yet, despite these key innovations involving new agents and instruments, 
the EU agenda continued to be dominated by the EU¶V normative µSROLWLFV¶aligning the 
outside to its modus operandi and taking an increasingly transactional and technocratic 
form (Korosteleva 2015).1  
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The third and perhaps the most comprehensive paradigmatic shift in the evolution of EU 
governance came about in 2011, involving substantive policy changes to place greater 
emphasis on µFRPPRQLQWHUHVW¶µVKDUHGRZQHUVKLS¶ and µPXWXDODFFRXQWDELOLW\¶
(European Commission 2011: 1). This new official discourse indicated a critical shift to 
a more inclusive approach, in an effort to recognize and acknowledge other stakeholders 
of the purported partnership. And yet again, LQWKHVSLULWRI(8µSROLWLFV¶all 
µinnovations¶ were largely EU-patented, leaving limited room for the Other to emerge 
as a constitutive part of the negotiation process. In particular, the revised approach 
included (1) more diversification of EU instruments, including roadmaps, and an 
Association Agreements; (2) a wider outreach, this time engaging all levels of society; 
and (3) a larger budget, also co-opting a range of international shareholders. The key 
format of this revised relationship could be described as EU µgovernance from a 
distance¶, implicating a less intrusive form of control to allow for more dialogue and 
local entrepreneurship, which was nevertheless carefully guided by the EU procurement 
criteria for the selected stakeholders only (Kurki 2011), as well as highly technocratic 
nature of rule transference. It could be argued that this approach succeeded in somewhat 
relaxing the straightjacket of (8µSROLWLFV¶ as a set of EU rules, by way of shifting it 
towards DPRUHµSROLWLFDO¶(dialogical) dimension in the EU¶V relations with 
neighbourhood countries,QSDUWLFXODULWFRLQHGDµmore for more¶ approach (European 
Commission 2011) which offered partners the opportunity to become the µGULYHrs¶of 
their own reforms, in terms of the expansion of the boundaries of cooperation availed to 
them, should they successfully comply with the EU acquis. At the same time, these new 
modalities, more than ever before, encapsulated WKH(8¶Vparochial and rather 
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endogenous style of governance which clearly centred around the EU Self and its vision 
of the established order epitomized by its increasingly technocratic enforcement onto 
the outside. The political dimension of the µPRUHIRUPRUH¶approach did not at all 
assume more choice or the alignment of interests between the partners. Rather, it aimed 
to extend and strengthen EU control over the more compliant partners by way of giving 
them more regulated access to the EU zone of rules. The visa liberalization in Moldova, 
explored below, exemplifies this trend well.      
 
In other words, all the innovations that EU external governance has experienced thus far 
towards its neighbourhood, have been the ones prioritizing and extending EU politics ± 
the established knowledge regime ± to the emergent outside, the neighbourhood, in 
order to foster a ring of µZHOO-JRYHUQHGFRXQWULHV¶LQWKH(8¶V backyard. And it is 
SUHFLVHO\EHFDXVHRIWKHODFNRIµWKHSROLWLFDO¶LQWKH(8¶V µSROLWLFV¶ approach, 
disallowing for ideological dialogue and contestation, that the normative clash between 
the EU¶V (D3DQG5XVVLD¶V(XUDVLDQSURMHFW3XWLQbecame inevitable in 2013 
(Korosteleva 2016). It is precisely here that we think that the current debate should be 
located to underline the importance of µothering¶ for recognizing and understanding the 
outside as the constitutive part of the Self to avoid normative conflicts of governance 
and ensure reciprocity between regional stakeholders. The case of Ukraine, in the 
context of the wider European space, exposed EU governance as one of the greatest 
mismanagements of the time, whereby the EU had clearly underestimated the presence 
of other power contestants in the region and, more crucially, ignored the sentiments of 
its own partner, Ukraine as the necessary Other in the process of expansion of its 
hegemonic regional order (Dutkievicz and Sakwa 2015; House of Lords Inquiry 2015; 
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Dragneva & Wolczuk 2015).2  
 
With a recent iteration of the ENP initiated by the European &RPPLVVLRQ¶s (2015a) 
consultation process in 2014-15, the policy is currently experiencing a fourth 
paradigmatic shift in EU governance, which could be termed as µtechnocratic¶ owing to 
the manner with which the Commission seeks to mend and re-structure EU neighbourly 
relations. By way of a µFRPSUHKHQVLYHDSSURDFK¶ WKHµUHYLVHG(13PXVWEHFRPHPRUH
SROLWLFDOGLIIHUHQWLDWHGDQGIRFXVHGDOOWKHZKLOHEDVHGRQWKH(8¶VYDOXHVDQG
SULQFLSOHV¶European Commission 2015c: 3). The revised vision reiterates the 
importance of µGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQDQGPXWXDORZQHUVKLS¶ZKLFKµZLOObe the hallmarks of 
WKHQHZ(13¶leading to PRUHLQYROYHPHQWRIµother regional actors, beyond the 
neighbourhood, where appropriate, LQDGGUHVVLQJWKHUHJLRQDOFKDOOHQJHV¶ibid.: 2-3). 
At the same time, while the new narratives intend to be reinvigorating and flexible, 
accounting for the needs of partners, and the presence of other actors in the region. 
There is a strong sense that the same old practices are likely to persist. In seemingly 
recognizing µthe outside¶ as different and diverse in its aspirations ± via differentiation 
and µothering¶ ± the European Commission, however, pledges to prioritize stability, in 
its relations with thHUHJLRQDQGLQGRLQJVRµWKH(8ZLOOSXUVXHLWVLQWHUHVWVZKLFK
LQFOXGHWKHSURPRWLRQRIXQLYHUVDOYDOXHVDQGWKH(8¶VRZQVWDELOLW\¶ibid). Once 
more, the EU is prepared to face the outside as the extension of its own Self ± by way of 
µSROLWLFV¶UDWKHUWKDQµWKHSROLWLFDO¶± in the process of externalizing its interests and 
rules of the established internal order.    
 
Working with the Other ± IURPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRIµWKHSROLWLFDO¶± involves reciprocal 
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learning, which does not only entail recognition, or acceptance of differences pertaining 
to cultural values, traditions, and patterns of behaviour, as historically contextualized 
and imprinted onto the outsiders. Rather, this new learning, as this chapter argues, 
should be about establishing a new value of the Other in relation to the Self, seeing it as 
distinct and instrumental for securing a legitimate and sustainable environment for all 
involved parties. In this new reading, and in order to make it functional, two more tenets 
need further exploring ± that is, differentiation and normalization, to which we now turn 
in the next sections.  
 
Differentiation or deviation in the context of µothering¶: EU-Azerbaijan relations 
 
If the EU intends to become a more effective global actor, it needs to recognize and 
engage with the interests and perceptions of other parties when designing its policies ± 
and to do so via the process of µRWKHULQJ¶, as argued above. µ2WKHULQJ¶LQWXUQFDQEH
achieved through differentiation, a process which allows for designing policies in 
bilateral relations on the basis of common interests of both parties. Since each partner 
country has its own specific national policy priorities and interests, one could advocate 
that bilateral relations between the EU and each ENP partner should also be conducted 
on an individual basis.  
 
One of the most instructive cases to explore the QHHGIRUµRWKHULQJ¶DQGGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQ
are EU-Azerbaijan relations. Brussels and Baku have engaged in bilateral relations since 
WKHODWWHU¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHIURPWKH6RYLHW8QLRQLQDQGtheir co-operation since 
then has proceeded in an amicable way (European Commission 2010b). More recently, 
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however, Azerbaijan has openly voiced its concerns, referring to the EU¶V policies as 
non-LQFOXVLYHDFFRUGLQJWRWKHJRYHUQPHQWLQ%DNXWKH(8¶VSURSRVHGIUDPHZRUNof 
cooperation under the EaP does not allow for sufficient input from the partner states, 
DQGGRHVQRWHQFRPSDVVWKHSDUWQHUV¶RZQQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWVin a satisfactory manner 
(Interview with Azerbaijani official, May 2015).  
 
While this may be commonplace in EU external relations more generally, relations with 
Azerbaijan make a particularly instructive case to study, largely for two main reasons: 
first, the Aliyev regime openly objects to WKH(8¶VXQLODWHUDOVWDQFH demanding a more 
equal treatment; and second, more importantly, the Azerbaijani often succeed in having 
their demands µKHDUG¶ This section will briefly assess the EU-Azerbaijan case to 
exemplify how this partner managed to affect the contents of its bilateral relations with 
the EU, and in what way this is applicable to the discussion of µothering¶ and 
differentiation for re-shaping the ENP agenda in the region.  
 
%DNXDQG%UXVVHOV¶REMHFWLYHVDQGREMHFWLRQV 
Both the EU and Azerbaijan have their own, divergent views on how the relations 
should be shaped, as well as on the principal objectives of their relationship. The EU, on 
the one hand, continues to apply a rather standardized policy strongly shaped by EU 
µSROLWLFV¶(GNLQV ± that is, a set of EU-driven objectives and requirements that 
OHDYHOLWWOHURRPIRUHLWKHUGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQRUµRWKHULQJ¶This is particularly evident from 
the difficult and yet persistent process (against all odds) of the EU negotiating an 
Association Agreement with Azerbaijan,3 or its continuing promotion of democracy and 
human rights despite the latter apparently having no effect on Azerbaijan whatsoever; or 
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indeed the (8¶Vrigid position towards the conflict resolution process in Nagorno-
Karabakh.  
 
Azerbaijan in turn, actively seeks a more differentiated and tailored policy approach, in 
which both Baku¶V DQG %UXVVHOV¶ SULRULWLHV DQG LQWHUHVWV DUH LQFOXGHG 3DXO quoted in 
Chiragov et al. 2015: 83; Pashayeva quoted in Chiragov et al. 2015: 39). These would in 
particular comprise the issues of Nagorno-Karabakh, economic cooperation, and values 
promotion, which are currently left indiscriminate or unaddressed altogether under the 
EaP. Azerbaijan feels disenchanted by the EU-centric process of decision-making, and 
unreciprocated in terms of having its own interests and needs equally represented in the 
framework of bilateral relations (Interview with an Azerbaijani official, July 2014). As 
some Azerbaijani officials contend, the EU renders no µRZQHUVKLS¶RIWKHSDUWQHUVKLSto 
the µother¶ side (Interview with an Azerbaijani official, May 2015).  
  
The Azerbaijani JRYHUQPHQW¶VPRWLYHVIRUGHPDQGLQJVXFKDGLIIHUHQWLDWHGDSSURDFK
are manifold. First, after gradually overcoming much of the post-transition difficulties, 
the country positions itself as an increasingly strong actor in international politics ± and 
hence demands more equal footing in the policy-making process with the EU and other 
regional actors (Interview with an independent expert, May 2014; interview with 
independent expert, May 2015). The country has become a more confident and much 
tougher negotiator in international relations, having enjoyed a sense of rising self-
awareness of its needs and capabilities (Interview with an EU official, April 2014).  
 
Second, relations between Azerbaijan and the EU are becoming more symmetrical than 
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WKH\XVHGWREHLQWKHVDQGPRVWRIWKHV$]HUEDLMDQ¶VUHODWLYHO\VWURQJ
position in bilateral relations stems from its economic independence, its disinterest in 
(8PHPEHUVKLSDQGWKHIDFWWKDWLWVHQHUJ\UHVRXUFHVSOD\DFUXFLDOSDUWLQWKH(8¶V
energy diversification strategy (Interview with a MS official, May 2014).  
 
7KLUGWKH$]HUEDLMDQLUHJLPHH[HUFLVHVDIRUHLJQSROLF\RIµEDODQFLQJ¶LQZKLFKWKH(8
is just one of many regional actors whom they choose to engage with in a 
complementary manner. Azerbaijan fears that aligning itself too closely with the EU ± 
for instance, through signing the AA ± would harm its relations with Russia. The 
government would therefore prefer to sign a tailor-made strategic agreement which 
would lead to a lighter formal conditionality and facilitate (or at least not hinder) a more 
reciprocal cooperation with the EU, Russia, Turkey, and Iran.  
 
Yet Brussels struggles to extend beyond its normative framework centred on the EU 
priorities to acknowledge the multifaceted position of the Azeri government. It keeps 
most policy domains withLQWKHVSKHUHRIµSROLWLFV¶± a rigidly shaped EU agenda 
reluctant to more open negotiations and contestation. Reasons for such a rationale are, 
yet again, manifold. They include, first, that the EU does not regard Azerbaijan 
significant enough a partner to engage in a tailor-made approach (as Brussels does with 
for instance Russia, China or India) (Interview with an EU official, May 2014). Second, 
and more importantly, the EU does not seem to be open to the idea of more reciprocity 
and selectivity in some areas of cooperation (Interview with an EU official, May 2014; 
interview with a MS official, May 2014). Notably, while Azerbaijan seeks less 
cooperation regarding shared values but more engagement concerning the Nagorno-
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Karabakh conflict, the EU, conversely, remains principled in its priorities. For the latter, 
universal liberal values and democracy promotion remain priority number one: when 
asked about the principles of partnership- building in the neighbourhood, an official of 
the European External Action Service UHDIILUPHGWKDWWKH(8¶VYDOXHVVKRXOGEH
considered as universal, and that there could not be any compromise on that (Interview 
with an EU official, July 2014).This is further reiterated in the newly revised ENP and 
its priorities (European Commission 2015b; 2015c).  
 
This puts differentiation ± DNH\QRWLRQLQWKH(8¶VUHYLVHGH[WHUQDOJRYHUQDQFH
framework ± in a stark contrast to EU practice: its interpretation of differentiation 
resembles more a permissive µGHYLDWLRQ¶IURPWKH(8standard than reciprocation of 
individual needs. From this perspective, partner states may seem to be allowed to opt 
out from certain areas of cooperation (albeit values promotion is non-negotiable), rather 
than to be given an opportunity of input to make policies more inclusive and needs-
based. This technocratized prescriptive approach to differentiation continues to 
epitomizHWKH(8¶V µSROLWLFV¶(GNLQVUDWKHUWKDQµWKHSROLWLFDO¶and is 
problematic in terms of further µboundary expansion¶ between the EU and Azerbaijan, 
as observed in a number of policy areas. 
 
Facilitating µothering¶ and differentiation through bargaining power  
More recently the Azerbaijani government has been deploying its growing bargaining 
power to try and facilitate µRWKHULQJ¶DQGGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQLQSROLF\DUHDVZKHUHWKH(8
refuses to consider $]HUEDLMDQ¶VLQWHUHVWVVXIILFLHQWO\%DNX¶VOHYHUDJHLVmostly based 
on its economic independence and strength, its strong diplomatic skills, and its (perhaps 
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less conventional) strategies of public relations and lobbying activities (European 
Stability Initiative 2012).4 
 
One area where Azerbaijan has been successful in doing so is paradoxically the 
promotion of democracy and human rights. While the EU maintains its policy agenda, 
the Baku government succeeds in diverting its focus or undermining its implementation 
by way of lobbying activities in Brussels or the adjournment of the annual human rights 
dialogue. Another area that indicates WKHFRXQWU\¶VJURZLQJOHYHUDJHLVits negotiations 
over the Association Agreement. Azerbaijan has managed to halt the discussion over the 
Association Agreement in 2013 while proposing two alternative agreements instead. 
The first, the Strategic Modernization Partnership, was rejected by Brussels on the 
grounds that it did not include sufficient attention to values and too much emphasis on 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict DQGWKHUHFRJQLWLRQRI$]HUEDLMDQ¶VWHUULWRULDOLQWHJULW\. 
In response, Azerbaijan then proposed a second alternative, the Strategic Partnership 
Agreement (SPA), in the summer of 2015. While the EU did not consider the Strategic 
Modernization Partnership seriously, it has agreed to hold negotiations over WKH63$¶V 
contents (Interview with an EU official, October 2015), and in 2016 the EEAS has 
received an official mandate for these negotiations (European Commission 2016). The 
SPA intends to be more tailored and inclusive of all aspects which are of interest to 
Azerbaijan and the EU, thus leaving some room for further negotiation.   
 
This suggests that countries like Azerbaijan are now able to gradually withstand the 
EU¶V pressure and to challenge its unilateral perspective, either by actively facilitating 
µRWKHULQJ¶DQGGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQ themselves, or by undermining crucial areas of 
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cooperation with the main power contestant.  
 
Yet, EU politics still remains the starting point for its external relations, unless partner 
states have the bargaining power to change this asymmetry and push the boundaries 
towards further negotiation. It is instrumental that the EU acknowledges and engages 
with the changing power dynamics in the neighbourhood and brings µWKHSROLWLFDO¶EDFN
into relations with all partner states, regardless of their leverage. ,QVWHDGRIµGHYLDWLRQ¶ a 
more inclusive form of differentiation is needed.  Differentiation should become a way 
of seeking  common ground with space for input from both sides, by way of µWKH
SROLWLFDO¶ As the case of EU-Azerbaijan relations shows, a genuine negotiation process 
ZKHUHE\WKH(8DVZHOODVWKHSDUWQHUVFDQH[SUHVVWKHLUYLHZVDQGZKHUHE\DOOSDUWLHV¶
main interests are being considered, would further friendly relations and may prevent 
partnHUVIURPILQGLQJZD\VWRLJQRUHRUDYRLGWKH(8¶VRQH-sided policies.  
Differentiation is therefore a core component of the µRWKHULQJ¶SURFHVV7KHVHFRQG
HOHPHQWµQRUPDOLVDWLRQ¶FDQEHXQSDFNHGE\ORRNLQJDWWKHFDVHRIYLVDOLEHUDOL]DWLRQ
and border management.  
 
2QHµQRUPDOLW\¶RUVHYHUDO the case of EU visa liberalization and border 
management in the Eastern region 
 
The process of visa liberalization is another example of EU µSROLWLFV¶, composed of 
technocratic strategies and techniques through which the EU seeks to extend and inhabit 
the external space with its own rules and regulations. 
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As Foucault (2007: 56) argues, µHYHU\ system of law is related to a system of QRUPV¶ 
and EU visa liberalization can therefore be seen as way of validating the (8¶V authority 
as a norm-maker in the neighbourhood. Visa liberalization is perhaps the most 
emblematic example of EU politics, as µGHFLVLRQV about it are taken in technical terms, 
following the advice of H[SHUWV¶ (Merheim-Eyre quoted in Bossong & Carrapico 2016), 
meaning that the issue is reduced to following the narrowly-defined EU procedures in 
shaping the outside.  
 
Emphasizing µSHRSOH-to-people FRQWDFW¶ gives EU policies an inclusive appearance, 
exemplifying its transformative power and effect (Börzel & Langbein 2013). Notably, a 
visa-free regime concluded with Moldova in April 2014, gave nearly 500,000 
Moldovans an opportunity to travel to the Schengen area (Interview with an expert of a 
non-governmental organization, June 2015), while visa liberalization as a process also 
stimulated the government¶s reform agenda.  
 
At the same time, there are some serious limitations to this process predicated on the 
EU politics-driven governance. As Foucault (2007: 57) explains, disciplinary techniques 
of normation (that is, subjection to RQH¶V norm) are based on the µSULPDF\ of RQH¶V norm 
in relation to the normaO¶ In this case, the curves go from an existing model (the 
µQRUP¶ with expected conformity, and seeking to cancel out what is deemed to be 
µDEQRUPDO¶ µ7KH QRUPDO¶ therefore, becomes that µZKLFK can conform to the [EU 
established] norm, and the abnormal ± that which is incapable of conforming to the 
QRUP¶ (ibid). In this sense, the fulfilment of the Visa Liberalisation Action Plans 
(VLAP) conditions becomes a disciplinary process of compliance and conformity with 
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the EU-set norms to regulate the normal and abnormal. They include four thematic 
blocks,5 and the assessment of relevant factors, including the µJDS DQDO\VHV¶ to achieve a 
high level of convergence with the relevant EU and international standards (European 
Commission 2010a).  
 
When examining VLAPs signed with Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, it is easily 
noticeable that the strategies remain the same: the EU norm is presented, and the 
µabnormal¶ is required to align with this norm. While, as an exception, *HRUJLD¶V VLAP 
is more detailed on block 3 (public order and security), the policy-specific bodies (such 
as anti-corruption agencies), strategies (including on IBM) and evaluations remain 
identical. Thus, despite the claims to differentiation, VLAPs reflect EU governance 
based more on deviation (rather than differentiation) and normation (as subjection to the 
EU norm): they may recognize differing levels of implementation across the blocks, but 
lack any alignments to the needs of the partners. Consequently, conceptual parameters 
are µSUHVHQWHG by the EU, and only tiny details are subject to QHJRWLDWLRQV¶ (Interview 
with an member state official, June 2015).  
 
This, however, has two major implications. First, the primacy of the EU norm leads to a 
situation whereby convergence with EU governance becomes self-justifying and, based 
on the EU preferences, leads to the inculcation of the EU norm, rather than a shared 
µQRUPDO¶. The EU¶V relations with the Belarusian and Azerbaijani leadership over 
human rights issues are particularly instructive. For example, instead of engaging in a 
dialogue with the respective governments to facilitate a new µQRUPDO¶ the EU has been 
calling on civil society impetus. Given the nature of the regimes in question, this has not 
24 
yielded much change. Owing to block 4 provisions on external relations and 
fundamental rights, a visa-free regime may give the EU a new opportunity for dialogue 
and incentivize partners in the region, and yet, as an EU official put it, this may not be 
applicable to the cases of Belarus and Azerbaijan as this would µGLVFUHGLW the EU 
PHWKRGRORJ\¶ (Interview with an EU official, June 2015) despite its initial intention to 
benefit the civil society in the first place.6 In this particular case, not only is µthe EU 
normal¶ highlighted as credible but it also comes to define the µSUDFWLFHV which fall 
outside their system as deviant EHKDYLRXU¶ (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: 198). 
 
The second implication of the EU¶V prescriptive governance is the lack of ownership of 
the reform process within the neighbourhood. By defining µthe normal¶, and controlling 
the process of reform, the EU also limits the possibility of conduct (or contestation) for 
the Eastern neighbours, promoting an EU-driven normative agenda while ignoring 
practices. According to one official, the problem of empowerment and the lack of 
constructive resistance (in contrast to bureaucratic gate-keeping) from the third 
countries has a serious impact on the future of sustainable reforms in the Eastern 
neighbourhood (Interview with a member state official; June 2015). In the case of Ukraine, 
the µimplementation [of VLAP-related reforms] has been very much ³copy and paste´ in 
the legislative process, and not reflected in practice¶ (Interview with a member state 
official; June 2015). Another member state official duly admitted that this was partially 
due to the EU¶V continuing insistence on EU-set µVWDQGDUGV¶ without taking into account 
the existing Ukrainian dispositions and needs, as well as controlling the means through 
which new practices can emerge (Interview with a member state official; June 2015). 
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Therefore, rather than seeking to create a space where the dispositions of the Other 
could function alongside the EU norms, the latter are often given an ultimate primacy. 
As one EU official summarized this: µbecause they are our neighbours, and so must be 
closer to our rules¶(Interview with an EU official; June 2015, thus defining the EU-Eastern 
QHLJKERXUV¶ relations more in opposition and asymmetry rather than as recognition of 
their respective normalities, for the reciprocal alignment. 
 
Bringing µWKH SROLWLFDO¶ back in? The interplay of normalities in border cooperation 
However, a closer analysis of border cooperation reveals a more differentiated 
approach, whereby the disciplinary normation of EU governance is replaced by 
normalization as the interplay of different normalities. Rather than losing µFRQWURO¶ by 
shifting from the established µSROLWLFV¶ border cooperation curiously reveals not only a 
greater emphasis on the experience of the Other, but also on the creation of an optimal 
space through which the EU can extend its µNQRwledge and power into wider and wider 
GRPDLQV¶ and attain lasting reforms (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: 198).  
 
A particularly important case study is the EU Border Assistance Mission to Ukraine and 
Moldova (EUBAM). Launched in 2005, EUBAM works with the government agencies 
(such as the Border Police and Customs) of the two countries by providing support on 
µSURFHGXUDO DVSHFWV¶ of border management, including cutting waiting times and moving 
from a military to a civilian service. Crucially, (8%$0¶V roles have evolved from the 
role of an implementer to that of facilitator. According to an EU official, EUBAM has 
been µdoing less, but doing it better¶, pointing to local needs and challenges, including 
smuggling, intellectual property rights and analytical reporting, such as the 
26 
Odessa/Illichivsk Sea Port Studies (Interview an EU official; June 2015). 
 
Such strategies have also translated into the emergence of new practices and facilitated 
inter-agency cooperation between Ukrainian and Moldovan officials that goes beyond 
the promotion of EU standards and provides a more comprehensive approach to border 
security in the Eastern neighbourhood. For example, EUBAM helped to pioneer two 
new types of Joint Border Crossing Points on the Moldova-Ukrainian border, 
strengthening cooperation through the introduction of joint checks between the two 
border guard services.  
 
Instead of relying on a pre-determined norm, (8%$0¶V techniques of normalization 
function through plotting of the µnormal¶ and the µabnormal¶, as the alignment of 
different curves of normality ± of what Foucault (2007: 63) referred to as the µLQWHUSOD\ 
of differential normalities¶. Normalization, in this case, starts with the normal, seeking 
to align the abnormal. In this case, rather than deducing the normal from the norm as in 
the case of disciplinary normation, the norm is deduced from the interplay of the normal 
and the abnormal, engaged in the role of a facilitator between the various actors, 
recognizing the complexities of, for example, the Moldova-Ukraine border and its 
Transnistria segment. Thus, as Hernandez I Segrera (2014: 177) concludes, µ(8%$0¶V 
activity has been more far-reaching than that of FRONTEX in the particular cases of 
Ukraine and MoldRYD¶  
 
The EUBAM example further highlights the importance of more µFUHDWLYH¶ ways of 
thinking about border management that go beyond the established EU norms and 
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practices, and takes into account local needs and experience. For example, six internal 
posts have been created under the Bureau for Migration and Asylum to document the 
flows of people to and from Transnistria, while also facilitating an increasing number of 
Transnistrians applying for Moldovan documents.7  
 
The EUBAM experience also underlines the importance of contestation in 
normalization. Recognizing the complexity of the local social order, the mission has 
been careful to restrain the Moldovan government from antagonizing the Tiraspol 
authorities, and vice versa. With its technical yet resourceful approach, EUBAM has 
attracted praise for its success which, ironically, has been less due to alignment with EU 
prescriptive governance, but more so due to creating an optimal space for considering 
both EU interests and partner FRXQWULHV¶ needs. However, recognizing those needs and 
applying strategies and instruments that facilitate the interplay of normalities (such as 
diverse cultures of border policing), are essential to conducting a more differentiated 
approach that is capable of transforming local practices. Crucially, EUBAM shows that, 
contrary to Edkins¶ (1999) argument, a shift from µWKH SROLWLFV¶ of disciplinary 
techniques towards µWKH SROLWLFDO¶ of optimal space can also happen gradually and 
through technical instruments, rather than historical raptures, including revolutions. 
 
Further thoughts and conclusion 
This chapter attempted to re-conceptualise the EU relations with the eastern region, by 
DSSO\LQJDQHZWKHRUHWLFDOIUDPHZRUNRIµSROLWLFV¶DQGµWKHSROLWLFDO¶in a wider context 
of the eastern neighbourhood and Russia. In conceptual terms, it became apparent that 
the relational nature of power is far more complex and understudied than is currently 
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understood. In order to survive and, more importantly, sustain itself, such power, in 
order to be influential, requires the recognition of and engagement with the Other vis-à-
vis the Self ± that is, the process of othering - which would enable the latter to treat the 
outside in its own right and diversity, and not as a simple extension of the Self.  
 
Furthermore, with the process of µothering¶, a more discernible meaning should also be 
given to its core tenets ± differentiation and normalization. With changing power 
dynamics in the neighbourhood, for the EU to stay (or become) an effective actor, it 
should engage with the interests and perceptions of other parties when designing its 
policies. One key aspect for accomplishing this, is to move away from the narrow 
interpretation of differentiation as deviation, to give it a new and a more distinct and 
inclusive meaning, to which success and difficulties in the EU-Azerbaijan relations 
H[SOLFLWO\DWWHVW7KLVW\SHRIGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQVKRXOGEHEDVHGRQµRWKHULQJ¶DQGLQWHUHVW
representation of both parties. By shifting from the bureaucracy of µSROLWLFV¶WRµWKH
SROLWLFDO¶ELODWHUDOUHODWLRQVFDQEHFRQGXFWHGLQDPRUHVXVWDLQDEOHPDQQHU 
 
Normalization in turn, would allow a more organic incorporation of differing interests 
and their normative underpinnings, into a new optimal space of cooperation and 
reciprocity between the EU and other partners. Its current unilateral normative format, 
as the case of VLAP in Moldova has clearly demonstrated, is both dejecting and 
counter-productive, and needs µWKH SROLWLFDO¶ to make relations more sustainable. 
Conversely, the EUBAM practices attest to a more effectual mode of engagement, when 
different normalities come to interact and align with each other in the production of a 
joint µQRUPDO¶  Albeit remaining technocratic in nature, such approach opens the field 
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to contestation and, consequently, to greater creativity that potentially lays foundations 
for more lasting reforms.  
 
To close this discussion of politics, the political and µothering¶, we insist that a new 
framing of international relations is needed. Both politics and the political are essential 
for power maintenance, but they work better in complementarity and as part of a 
relational power nexus, especially when applied to ideologically contested zones of 
interest. Concerning the neighbourhood, developing a more discerning approach by the 
EU to the ENP partner countries and to the other contestant powers in the region, by 
way of µothering¶, differentiation and normalization, would send the right signal of 
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